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THE PROFILE: DESIGNER DISCLOSURE FOR
MUTUAL FUNDS*
Bevis Longstretht
The country is experiencing a series of inversions. In the
stock market, new era thinking dominates the old ideas, with
market price setting the standards for value rather than
standards for value determining market price.' From
academia comes a call for replacing the country's widely
acclaimed regulation of the equities markets to protect
investors with a market-oriented approach of competitive
federalism, whereby issuers select the nature of regulation to
which they will be subject, with states and the federal
government competing for business.2
Now, coming to what this Author proposes to discuss, the
SEC has taken unprecedented steps to dilute the time-honored
principle of mandatory disclosure by encouraging the use by
investors of a short-form prospectus-the "Profile"--in the
selection of mutual funds.
In the discussion which follows, this Author will try to
convince you that Rule 498-the Profile Rule-constitutes a
large mistake by the SEC-a large mistake because, in
adopting this rule, the SEC has:
1) required investors to define for themselves the amount of
information they need to make an investment decision;
2) encouraged the impression that the Profile contains all the
information investors need;
3) with seeming inconsistency, retained the notion that the
full prospectus is "the primary disclosure document
© 1998 Bevis Longstreth. All Rights Reserved.
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' Gretchen Morgenson, A Time to Value Words of Wisdom, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
16, 1998, at § 3 (Money & Business) at 1.
2 Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation 100 YALE L.J. 2359, 2361-63 (1998).
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contemplated under the federal securities laws" and amended
it in many useful respects to focus disclosure "on essential
information" about a mutual fund, knowing that much of that
"essential information" will never be seen by investors opting
to look only at the Profile;'
4) based the rule on focus group reactions to pilot profiles,
which may have established that prospectuses in current use
were hard to comprehend but did not prove that investors
preferred the simplified disclosure of the pilot to a well-written
prospectus containing all material information;
5) determined for itself what can, and what cannot, be
included in the Profile, thereby preventing mutual funds from
including in the Profile information that they consider material
to investor choice but that is not covered by one of the nine
specific items of information required to be included; and
6) excluded from what is includable in the Profile a large
number of items of information clearly material to prudent
investor choice.
Each of these items is unprecedented. Taken together they
represent a major shift by the SEC away from its long
espousal of mandatory disclosure of all material facts in favor
of enhanced readability for average investors through brevity
and simplicity of expression. This well-intentioned effort is
misguided. It is a Faustian bargain that begins by short-
changing the public investor and, predictably, will end by
impairing the SEC's reputation and independence.
I. WHAT RULE 498 DOES
Rule 498 gives investors a choice. Thus, at the outset, the
Profile Release4 states:
A fund that offers a Profile will be able to give investors a choice of
the amount of information that they wish to consider before making
a decision about investing in the fund; investors will have the option
' Registration Form Used by Open-End Management Investment Companies,
Securities Act Release No. 33-7512, 66 SEC Docket 1629, 1998 WL 107729, at *1,
*4 (Mar. 13, 1998) thereinafter Form N-1A Release].
New Disclosure Option for Open-End Management Investment Companies,
Securities Act Release No. 33-7513, 66 SEC Docket 1703, 1998 VL 107724 (Mar.
13, 1998) [hereinafter Profile Release].
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of purchasing the fund's shares after reviewing the information in
the Profile or after requesting and reviewing the fund's prospectus
(and other information).
An investor deciding to purchase fund shares on the basis of
the Profile will receive the fund's prospectus with confirmation
of the purchase. Under the Securities Act, the Profile is a sum-
mary disclosure document permitted under Section 10(b) while
the prospectus meets the disclosure requirements of Section
10(a). Of course, it is highly unlikely that any significant num-
ber of investors who base their investment decision on the
Profile will read the prospectus when it arrives. The ICI Profile
Survey' found that, even without the Profile, only half of fund
shareholders ever consult a prospectus before investing.
As addressed in more detail later, the Profile's content is
limited by rule to nine items, thereby omitting by design mat-
ters of materiality to investors. The legend required on the
cover page of the Profile states (emphasis added): "This profile
summarizes key information about a fund that is included in
the fund's prospectus." However, it is perfectly clear that the
SEC recognizes that the Profile's "key" information will not
encompass all that is material to informed investor choice
since it has declared that a prospectus meeting the require-
ments of recently amended Form N-lA will contain only "es-
sential" information. The Form N-lA Release explains the
Commission's objective in amending the disclosure require-
ments for the prospectus as follows: "The amendments to
Form N-lA seek to make the prospectus, which will remain a
fund's primary disclosure document, a more effective tool by
focusing its contents on information that is essential to an
investment in the fund."
6
II. THE COMMISSION'S NEW IDEA OF CHOICE
This principle of choice for investors, starting with a docu-
ment acknowledged to contain less than all information "essen-
tial" for informed investor choice, is both unprecedented and
deeply troubling. To grasp the magnitude of choice an investor
Form N-1A Release, supra note 3, at *2 n.5.
6 Form N-1A Release, supra note 3, at *4 (emphasis added). The term "essen-
tial" appears to be new to the securities laws; its meaning remains obscure.
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seeking the whole story about a fund would have to exercise,
consider that even the prospectus omits information material
to an investment decision. Beyond the prospectus, there are
two other documents an investor can request: the fund's state-
ment of additional information ("SAI") and the fund's annual
or semi-annual report. The Profile's legend is required to state:
' You may obtain the prospectus and other information about
the Fund at no cost by calling - ."' Of course, it would
take a sophisticated investor to know enough to ask for these
documents, which are not referred to by name in the Profile
and contain material information not otherwise available. The
shareholder reports are not only the sole source of portfolio
holdings but typically contain the required discussion by the
fund's management of the fund's performance ("MDFP"). The
MDFP is the mutual fund's analog to the management's dis-
cussion and analysis ("MD&A") section of a commercial
company's prospectus. It is likely to be one of the most impor-
tant and revealing bodies of information about the manager's
thinking and methodology as can be found anywhere in the
various disclosure documents.
In 1983, when the SEC adopted the SAI concept to allow a
shortened prospectus to be used with the offer to supply addi-
tional information through the SAI upon request, it permitted
incorporation of the SAI by reference in the prospectus.8
Aware of the risk that, under Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities
Act, a court could impose liability if information in the SAI
included material facts necessary to make the statements in
the prospectus not misleading,9 and that mandatory incorpo-
ration by reference might be construed as an admission that,
without the SAI, the prospectus lacked information necessary
to meet the Section 12(a)(2) standard, the SEC made incorpo-
ration by reference voluntary. Moreover, it specifically found
that the prospectus, standing alone, met the disclosure stan-
' Profile Release, supra note 4, at *11 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
' See Registration Form Used by Open-End Management Investment Compa-
nies, Proposed Guidelines, Release No. 33-6447, 26 SEC Docket 1500, 1982 WL
35958 (Dec. 27, 1982) [hereinafter SAI Proposing Release]; Registration Form Used
by Open-End Management Investment Companies, Guidelines, Release No. 33-6479,
28 SEC Docket 682, 1983 WL 35814 (Aug. 12, 1983) [hereinafter SAI Adopting Re-
lease].
' SAI Proposing Release, supra note 8, at *9.
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dard of Section 10(a) of the Securities Act in that it contained
all information "'necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors.'""
III. THE PROFILE FAILS TO PROTECT INVESTORS
Whatever the merits of the SEC's claim that the prospec-
tus, without the SAI, meets the disclosure requirements for a
Section 10(a) prospectus under the Securities Act, it is clear
the Profile does not. The SEC resisted industry demands to
allow the prospectus to be incorporated by reference in the
Profile, arguing that to do so would be inconsistent with the
idea that the Profile is a self-contained document on the basis
of which an investor could decide to invest."
To allow the Profile to be used as the Commission intends,
a finding had to be made under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Act that the use of the Profile as a "summary prospectus" was
"necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the pro-
tection of investors." 2 Given the likely effect of the Profile to
reduce sharply the numbers of investors who will read the
prospectus, and the fact that the Profile admittedly omits in-
formation essential to informed investor choice, it is difficult to
understand how the SEC could find the Profile either "'neces-
sary or appropriate.., for the protection of investors.'"'3 In-
deed, a well developed argument might be advanced that Rule
498 is sufficiently "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion
or otherwise not in accordance with law" as to be beyond the
SEC's discretionary powers to adopt."
The SEC points to its experience with the SAI as support
for peeling away from the Profile essential information con-
tained in the prospectus. However, this experience is inappo-
site because, in the case of the prospectus, the SEC made a
finding that, standing alone, it met the disclosure require-
10 SAI Adopting Release, supra note 8, at *5.
, Profile Release, supra note 4, at *6 (footnote omitted).
, Securities Act of 1933, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10) (1997).
13 The Commission's stated explanation appears in the Profile Release, supra
note 4, at *4 (footnote omitted).
" 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1998); see, e.g., Checkosky v. SEC, 139 F.3d 221 (D.C.
Cir. 1998); Business Rundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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ments of a Section 10(a) prospectus after the SAI information
had been removed. No such finding has been made in the case
of the Profile, nor could it.
IV. SOME OF THE MATERIAL FACTS OMITrED FROM THE
PROFILE
Unlike the prospectus, which may contain information not
specifically required by Form N-1A,"5 the Profile may contain
only the items specified or expressly permitted by Rule 498.16
Thus, the Profile may not contain a listing of the fund's top ten
portfolio holdings, a very important disclosure item only avail-
able to an investor who is considering a fund if she knows
enough to ask for an annual or semi-annual report to share-
holders, where such information can be found, or is a subscrib-
er to Morningstar. There is no need in the Profile to indicate
the size of companies (large cap or small), or whether they
express a value or growth style, or whether they number in the
hundreds or fewer than 30. Further, there may not be an in-
vestment style box, also found in Morningstar, which gives the
investor an easy-to-understand grasp of the riskiness of the
fund and the relative size of the stocks being used. Nor may
there be included such modern portfolio theory measures of
risk as Alpha, Beta, the Sharp Ratio, R-Squared or Standard
Deviation, each of which is found in Morningstar.
The only risk-related disclosure actually specified in Pro-
file instructions is to the effect that "loss of money is a risk of
investing in the fund."'7 As Roger Lowenstein wrote in the
Wall Street Journal, "a more serious problem relates to the
narrative discussion of risk-supposedly the heart of the new
Profiles... samples offered by fund companies are generalized
to the point of irrelevancy."8
Financial highlights may not be included nor may a dis-
cussion of the market conditions and investment strategies
that significantly affected the fund's performance in the past
15 Form N-1A, General Instructions, C(3)(b).
16 Securities Act of 1933, Rule 498(b), 17 C.F.R. § 230.498(b) (1998).
Form N-1A, Pt. A, Item 2(c)(1)(i).
Roger Lowenstein, Intrinsic Value: Time for Straight Talk from Mutual
Funds, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 1997, at C1.
1024 [Vol. 64: 3
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year. Turnover may not be included. Return adjusted for risk
and adjusted for taxes may not be included nor may the imbed-
ded capital appreciation of a fund be shown. Although the
fund's performance must be compared to a "broad-based securi-
ties market index,"1 9 its portfolio may not be broken down by
industry sectors and compared with the sector weightings in
that index. Moreover, the fund's performance may not be com-
pared to the performance of other funds, an item of informa-
tion at least as important as the comparison to an index, and
included in Morningstar.
If three or more individuals are responsible for day-to-day
portfolio management, none need be identified by name and
through length of service with the past performance achieved
by the fund. Of course, it is crucial to informed investor choice
to be able to identify as best one can what individual or group
of individuals "owns" a fund's past performance. The way Rule
498 appears to be written, if one person had been chiefly re-
sponsible for, say, a brilliant ten year record and had died, the
fund could avoid disclosure of this crucial fact by making three
or more managers jointly responsible for the fund's portfolio."
Such useful financial data as the portfolio's average P/E
ratio, P/B ratio, five-year earnings growth, return on assets
and debt to capital ratio, compared to the measuring market
index averages, may not be included.
Permitted as an option, but not required, is disclosure
about the types of investors for whom the fund is intended and
the types of investment goals that may be consistent with an
investment in the fund.2 How a particular fund might fit into
an investor's overall financial plan and portfolio is one of the
most important factors to consider in making choices among
funds. Not only should this disclosure item be required, but an
effort should be made in Profile instructions to assure a thor-
ough texturing of the response keyed to the particular invest-
ment style and goals of the fund. Here a big opportunity for
investor education and sound counseling is being missed.
'9 Form N-1A, Pt. A, Item 2(c)(2)(iii)(2).
20 Securities Act of 1933, Rule 498(c)(2)(v)(C), 17 C.F.R. § 230.498(c)(2)(v)(C)
(1998).
21 Securities Act of 1933, Rule 498(c)(2)(iii), 17 C.F.R. § 230.498(c)(2)(iii) (incor-
porating Item 2(c)(1)(i) of Form N-1A). Such disclosure is also optional in the pro-
spectus. See Form N-1A, Pt. A, Item 2(c)(1)(c).
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In addition to the above, there may not be disclosure as to
the manager's investment stake in the fund, an item at least
as important as the ownership by business directors of the
stock of the companies on whose boards they sit.
The Profile may only contain a summary of the fund's
principal investment strategies and principal risks. This leaves
out non-principal, yet highly material, strategies and risks,
which in each case could be important to both investor choice
and investment return.
In considering the omissions of material fact that result
from using the Profile, one should bear in mind the level of
disclosure demanded of investment managers by institutional
investors. Since the original idea behind the securities laws
was for a governmental agency to mandate disclosure of all
material facts for the benefit of those unable to demand such
disclosure for themselves, one useful benchmark for measuring
how well the agency is performing this task would be to exam-
ine the items of disclosure used by institutional investors in
picking investment managers. This process at the institutional
level is directly analogous to a retail investor's search for the
appropriate mutual fund or funds.
The use of manager questionnaires by institutions has
become commonplace. Aided sometimes by selection managers,
the questionnaires in use today are very similar to one another
and call for a large amount of information considered relevant
to manager choice. Without itemizing all the data typically
adduced in this process, it is safe to say that only a tiny frac-
tion of it would appear in the Profile. Among the important
items covered by a typical questionnaire, for example, are firm
changes over the past five years, ownership structure, litiga-
tion, third party arrangements for marketing, professional
turnover over the past five years, incentive compensation ar-
rangements for employees, clients gained and lost over the
past three years, investment style and impact of size on style
effectiveness, nature of investment decision-making process,
buy and sell discipline, risk control techniques, portfolio char-
acteristics, trading process and costs, performance details over
the past ten years (e.g., for equity only and equity plus cash)
and key personnel data (background, years with firm, portfo-
lios managed, other responsibilities).
1026 [Vol. 64: 3
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These questionnaires make the investment manager the
principal focus of inquiry. The Profile does not follow suit, nor
does the prospectus, SAI or annual reports, in itself a failing of
the SEC's mandatory disclosure system, which focuses princi-
pally on the mutual fund rather than the investment adviser
controlling its operations. The point here is not to urge the
SEC to mandate a disclosure document equivalent to the stan-
dard questionnaire used by institutions. The questionnaires
should, however, be used by the SEC to obtain a valuable list
of items generally considered material to the most sophisticat-
ed investors in the land. From such a list, the SEC might de-
velop a list of its own, tailored to meet the needs of retail
investors.
The information contained in the Profile is so far removed
from the information covered in these questionnaires that one
is tempted to conclude the connection between the two has yet
to be treated with importance by the SEC.
V. THE PROFILE RAISES QUESTIONS OF LIABILITY
It has occurred to many that use of the Profile may expose
a fund to liability for material misstatements or omissions
under Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act." This paper will
not study that question except to note that the Profile Release
seems correct in stating that potential liability would arise if a
Profile contained a material misstatement or omitted a state-
ment necessary to make the disclosure in the Profile not mate-
rially misleading." The question remains whether a docu-
ment encouraged by the SEC to provide the basis for an invest-
ment decision that omits information deemed by the SEC to be
"essential" to informed investor choice renders the information
included in that document materially misleading. There is at
least a plausible case for this result. Moreover, the SEC's reli-
ance on the advertisement rule (Rule 434d) to suggest that lia-
bility would not be found in regard to the Profile is misplaced.
Investors are not permitted to rely on an advertisement to pur-
2 See, e.g., STUART M. STRAUSS & JON D. KAPLON, NEW DISCLOSURE RULES
AND OPTIONS FOR MUTUAL FUNDS: DO THEY OPEN THE DOOR TO LITIGATION AND
LIABILITY? 273 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. BO-
002C, 1998).
" Profile Release, supra note 4, at *6.
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chase.24 In the case of the Profile, the SEC allows, indeed,
encourages, reliance solely on the Profile. This being so, it is
puzzling to find the SEC inviting comparison between the
Profile and Rule 434d advertisements."
VI. THE PROFILE AS INVITATION TO WAIVER
In a sense what the SEC has done in allowing investors to
choose the kind of disclosure they want is to effect for them a
waiver of the protection intended for investors under the Secu-
rities Act. Section 14 of the Securities Act flatly prohibits a
waiver of rights by investors. In approving the Profile, the SEC
is blessing a de facto waiver by an investor of its statutory
right to consider an offer of fund shares only through a pro-
spectus. The Profile turns mandatory disclosure on its head.
Those investors least sophisticated are the ones who most need
the protection of the law's mandate for full disclosure. Yet, it is
those same investors-referred to in the N-1A release as "av-
erage or typical"--who are most likely to rely solely on the
Profile, being too uninformed to know that material informa-
tion about the fund has been deleted from the Profile and is
sprinkled through at least three other documents available
only upon request.
VII. WHAT IS THE GOAL OF A MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
SYSTEM?
In defending its action against critics of the Profile, who
pressed the SEC to work on improving the prospectus rather
than promoting an abbreviated disclosure document that,
standing alone, would inadequately inform investors, the SEC
declared the critics' viewpoint "inconsistent with the senti-
ments of fund investors."6 One need not challenge the SEC's
21 STRAUSS & KAPLON, supra note 22, at 301.
' Don Phillips, head of Morningstar, the mutual fund information provider,
compared the Profile to a sales document. See Don Phillips, Open Letter to the
SEC (May 2, 1997) <http'//www.morningstar.nettcgi-bin/GetNews.exe?NewsStory=
MS/OpEd/LetterToSEC1/lettertosec.l.html>.
" Profile Release, supra note 4, at *4.
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reading of the focus group polls to argue against the use of so
ethereal a premise as "investor sentiment" to ground the ele-
ments of disclosure in a mandatory system.
What, then, is the standard for mandatory disclosure un-
der the Securities Act?
This Author has always believed that a prospectus for the
sale of securities should, as a bedrock minimum, contain
enough information to enable a reasonable investor, who may
be equated with a fiduciary acting with legally sufficient care,
to determine whether or not to invest. This standard should
not be understood to mean that there could be no additional
information outside the prospectus that in the exercise of rea-
sonableness, an investor would wish to have. It is simply to
say that the prospectus should seek to provide the minimum
necessary to enable a reasonable investor to make an invest-
ment choice. Short of that level of disclosure, it is difficult to
see why Congress would have bothered to mandate disclosure
at all.2
7
Outside the mutual fund arena, this standard has certain-
ly been met. The idea of including all material information
permeates the Securities Act, the cases that have interpreted it
and the disclosure forms developed by the Division of Corpora-
tion Finance. In fact, Rule 408 goes beyond the specific items
of disclosure elicited by the forms to require disclosure of "such
further material information, if any, as may be necessary to
make the required statements, in the light of the circumstanc-
es under which they are made, not misleading." Given the
dramatic trend among investors to prefer mutual funds to
direct investment in the markets, it is all the more remarkable
to find the SEC encouraging a large reduction in the quality
and quantity of information required to be furnished to fund
investors-a reduction from a level of disclosure already sig-
nificantly below that required for other kinds of business
entities.
The reasonable investor standard for disclosure follows
from the case law determining when a misrepresentation or
omission in the prospectus is material and, accordingly, gives
2? In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953), the Supreme Court
said that the federal securities laws exist "to protect investors by promoting full
disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment decisions."
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rise to liability. As the Supreme Court ruled in Basic, Inc. v.
Levison, an omission will be judged material only if there is "a
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by a reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made avail-
able."28 This "reasonable" investor can properly be equated
with a fiduciary who invests through the exercise of due care;
that is, a reasonable investor is a fiduciary acting non-negli-
gently, or, in other words, "reasonably," under the
circumstances.
This standard for disclosure is also supported by the fidu-
ciary duty imposed by the Securities Act on directors and offi-
cers to use care in assuring that the prospectus contains no
material misrepresentations or omissions."
The large reduction in scope and quality of information in
the Profile below that provided to investors in other kinds of
business entities cannot be explained by a claim that mutual
funds are easy to understand. The SEC has long been of the
opinion that the ability of investors to evaluate the risks of
investing in managed pools requires a higher degree of
sophistication than is required to evaluate the risks of invest-
ing in ordinary business entities." It was for this reason that
the "qualified purchaser" exception in Section 3(c)(7) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940, added by the Securities
Markets Improvement Act of 1996, rejected the accredited
investor standard for unregistered offerings under the Securi-
ties Act in favor of a much higher standard of presumed so-
phistication, requiring of a natural person at least $5 million
in investments.
Regardless of the correctness of the SEC's view on the
relative levels of sophistication required for these different
kinds of investments, it is all the more surprising to find the
SEC embracing the Profile's reductionist approach to disclo-
sure in light of its strongly held view on the matter and its
success in selling that view to Congress.
28 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (citation omitted).
29 Securities Act of 1933, § 11(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (1997).
'0 DIV. OF INV. MANAGEMENT, SEC, PROTECTING INVESTORS: A HALF CENTURY
OF INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION 113 (May 1992). The authors of this Re-
port provide no basis for this conclusion.
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VIII. THE DESIGNER APPROACH TO DISCLOSURE
In its profile and N-IA releases, the SEC announces a new
standard of disclosure. Nowhere does the goal of putting in the
hands of investors all information material to investor choice
appear. To the contrary, as the Profile Release states, "[tihe
Commission's strongly held belief is that the principal goal of
fund disclosure.., should be to provide investors with useful
and relevant information."31 The priority for funds is to "de-
sign disclosure documents .. . first and foremost, to communi-
cate information to investors effectively."32 In the case of the
Profile, this meant short, summary disclosure of only the infor-
mation specified by the nine items in Rule 498. As to other
material information in the prospectus, SAI or report to share-
holders, the SEC declared that "an investor who believes that
he or she needs more information before making [a purchase]
decision has the option of obtaining additional information by
requesting the fund's prospectus or other disclosure materi-
als."33 Translated, these statements imply that the SEC con-
siders even average fund investors capable of "fending for
themselves," a standard heretofore reserved for institutional
and other sophisticated investors who did not need the
protections of the Securities Act.
The SEC has defended the Profile's approach to disclosure
by observing that most retail investors do not read the prospec-
tus or SAI, due to their length, complexity and lack of informa-
tion useful in the selection of mutual funds. Investors rely
instead on magazines, mutual fund reviews, employer screens
and word of mouth.
The solution to a form of prospectus that no one reads is
not a slimmed down document omitting material information.
If we are going to have a mandatory system to afford protec-
tion to investors, recognizing we can only expect to make pro-
tection available, not guarantee its use, then the answer to
non-use cannot be to lower the level of protection afforded. It
must be, instead, to afford the necessary protection (all materi-
al information) in a form that is as comprehensible to the aver-
31 Profile Release, supra note 4, at *5.
32 Form N-1A Release, supra note 3, at *5 (emphasis added).
Profile Release, supra note 4, at *9 (footnote omitted).
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age investor as humanly possible. Vanguard's materials and
those of the College Retirement Equities Fund 4 are striving
to meet this challenge. Surely it can be done, and may be done,
in time without SEC help. How much faster and more certain
of result would the evolution be, however, were the SEC to
provide leadership.
As to reliance on third party materials, they are not sub-
ject to the principles of complete disclosure that underlie an
SEC-mandated system. Indeed, were one to conclude that reli-
ance on such materials was sufficient, it would seriously un-
dermine any logical basis for imposing mandatory disclosure.
The SEC's instincts for greater, rather than less, disclo-
sure, deeply ingrained from more than six decades of service to
investors, are bound to continue but with difficulty because of
the Profile initiative. A current example will illustrate this
point. The SEC will soon release a report on the use of "soft
dollars" by fund managers in effecting transactions through
broker-dealers. At a minimum, the SEC is likely to demand
greater disclosure to fund shareholders of "soft dollar" practic-
es, how those practices impact fund expenses and performance,
what effect they have on the duty to obtain "best execution"
and other related matters. However, where can this disclosure
be placed so that investors are informed? Certainly not in the
Profile. Indeed, given the plain English directive, on the one
hand, and the hideously complex and ambiguous nature of the
practices represented by the innocuous and opaque terms "soft
dollars" and "best execution," on the other hand, it is difficult
to see how useful disclosure could appear in any of the other
documents required to be made available to investors.
IX. EMH INAPPLICABLE TO MUTUAL FUNDS
Another important aspect to disclosure in the case of mu-
tual funds deserves mention. The efficient market hypothesis
("EMH"), which claims that stock prices in an active market-
place will reflect all publicly available information, supports
the idea that an investor need not know the contents of an
issuer's disclosure documents to get a fair price. The market
" In the interest of full disclosure, the Author is a member of the Board of
Trustees of College Retirement Equities Fund and of its mutual funds.
[Vol. 64: 3
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sets a fair price regardless. By relying on this hypothesis, the
SEC was able to justify allowing a seasoned issuer to incor-
porate by reference in its prospectus the extensive information
on file with the SEC in its annual report on Form 10-M"5
EMH has no application to mutual funds because there is
no active trading market for mutual fund shares, which are
always redeemable by the fund at net asset value. Thus, no
pricing mechanism can be claimed the vicarious champion of
an investor who is not furnished all material information about
a fund. This fact makes the argument for full disclosure to
mutual fund investors significantly more powerful than in the
case of other kinds of equity products. When Michael Price
announced his retirement as chief investment strategist for the
Mutual Series of mutual funds, the net asset value of those
funds changed not a bit as a result. Yet, for a fund investor,
Price's decision was supremely important. Almost none of the
highly material facts about a mutual fund (and, most impor-
tantly, its investment adviser) will affect net asset value, or, as
a result, the price at which investors can access or exit the
fund.
X. THE PROFILE IS A MISTAKE WITH POTENTIALLY LARGE
CONSEQUENCES
It was a very serious mistake for the SEC to accede to the
view that investing is such a simple process that one can do it
knowing just the information responding to those nine items in
the Profile. When a sharp market adjustment occurs, or a
prolonged decline, it will be the SEC to whom questions from
investors, the press and the Congress will be addressed, not
the Investment Company Institute, the mutual fund trade
association that lobbied hard and successfully for the Profile.
Moreover, regardless of correlations between investor loss and
the Profile's dumbing-down simplicity, the SEC will be blamed
for failing adequately to warn investors that picking funds
carefully is important and requires digesting a lot of informa-
tion beyond what is available in the Profile.
35 See SECURITY ACT RULES 6331, 23 SEC Docket 288, 290-291 (1981); SECURI-
TY ACT RULES 6383, 24 SEC Docket 1262, 1267 (1982).
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
The stakes here are large. Since 1933, U.S. securities
regulation has succeeded brilliantly in large measure because
it was rooted in mandatory disclosure, enforced by an agency
renowned for its independence and vigor. More than any other
administrative agency, the SEC was successful in resisting
capture by either politicians or the industries it regulated. This
relatively non-intrusive form of regulation, from which the
nation has benefitted so much, including, especially, the mutu-
al fund industry, will be at profound risk should the markets
cause widespread losses to individuals whose rising expecta-
tions have been abetted, not corrected, by SEC endorsement of
the Profile.
The severity of risk results from two additional features of
today's marketplace. First, since adoption of the Profile, the
shape of our stock market grew daily more bubble-like. Despite
the third quarter decline in 1998, the bubble has grown apace
to unprecedented levels. 6 If, when, and how large a market
correction there will be is anyone's guess. Clearly, it could be
very large. Second, individuals are increasingly being put in
charge of investing for their retirement through defined contri-
bution plans such as 401(k)s. If the market regresses to the
mean, as it did in the mid-70s, the pain will be felt by a very
broad segment of society. Congress, feeling that pain vicari-
ously, will look for scapegoats. The Profile will point the way to
the SEC and the disclosure-based system of regulation it dilut-
ed. The result could be far more intrusive regulation, mandat-
ed by a Congress under pressure to "do something." Embattled
and defensive, the SEC would lack the influence to block such
a move.
XI. Is THERE AN ALTERNATIVE?
There is an alternative to dumbing-down disclosure in
response to investor dissatisfaction with the turgidity of docu-
ments currently in use. The success of Morningstar is convinc-
ing proof that investor demand exists for material information
that is unavailable through SEC-mandated disclosure. More-
over, the ICI's research report, "Understanding Shareholders'
3' See, e.g., MORGAN STANLEY DEAN WrITER, INVESTMENT PERSPECTIVES 1-2
(Feb. 16, 1999) (comment of Barton M. Biggs).
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Use of Information and Advisers," contains the finding that 72
percent of those surveyed expressed an interest in learning
more about mutual funds. Rather than experiment with a
vastly less useful document to sell mutual fund shares, one
that, standing alone, will impair the SEC's reputation as pro-
tector of investor interests, the SEC should encourage industry
leaders to compete in the development of selling documents
that would provide all reasonably material information in
language comprehensible to the non-professional investor. The
SEC would have to loosen up the requirements of the prospec-
tus and SAI enough to make such an experiment possible.
Given the high quality of this industry's leadership, and its
long record of effectiveness in pursuing its self-interest, this
Author is confident such an experiment would quickly lead to
the establishment of "guild standards" far superior in their
capacity to inform than almost anything currently in use.

